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ABSTRACT
We use 4 years of data from the retiree health benefits program of the University of Michigan to estimate the effect of price
on the health plan choices of Medicare beneficiaries. During the period of our analysis, changes in the University’s premium
contribution rules led to substantial price changes. A key feature of this ‘natural experiment’ is that individuals who had
retired before a certain date were exempted from having to pay any premium contributions. This ‘grandfathering’ creates
quasi-experimental variation that is ideal for estimating the effect of price. Using regression discontinuity methods, we
compare the plan choices of individuals who retired just after the grandfathering cutoff date and were therefore exposed to
significant price changes to the choices of a ‘control group’ of individuals who retired just before that date and therefore
did not experience the price changes. The results indicate a statistically significant effect of price, with a $10 increase in
monthly premium contributions leading to a 2 to 3 percentage point decrease in a plan’s market share. Copyright © 2012 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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For many years, leading healthcare reform proposals have been based on the concept of ‘managed competition’
(Enthoven, 1993). Under this approach, consumers choose from a menu of health plans offering similar
benefits. Although premiums are subsidized by a sponsor—the government in the case of these public policy
proposals and employers in existing private sector health benefit programs—the subsidies are set so that
consumers choosing more costly plans bear the incremental cost of that decision. The goal of this arrangement
is to induce consumers to choose less costly plans and to switch plans when premiums change, which in turn
will provide an incentive for health plans to compete more vigorously on price. Price-elastic demand is critical
for the success of this strategy.
Variants of the managed competition approach have been adopted in recent policy initiatives and have
been embraced by policy makers and analysts across the political spectrum. Consumer choice of health
plans is a key element of the recently enacted Federal healthcare reform legislation. Starting in 2014, newly
insured individuals will be able to purchase insurance through state-sponsored health insurance exchanges
designed according to the principles of managed competition. The Commonwealth Connector, a purchasing
pool established as part of the 2006 Massachusetts healthcare reforms, is another notable example of this
approach (Kingsdale, 2010).
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Managed competition has also been proposed as a model for restructuring Medicare to control the growth of
program spending. In the 1990s, there were several prominent proposals,1 and the managed competition
approach was a major focus of the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare that was
established at the end of the decade. Although most of its members supported reforms based on this model,
the commission did not achieve the supermajority vote required to make a formal recommendation.2
Competition among private insurers is also a central component of the Medicare reform strategy proposed
by Representative Paul Ryan (2011).
Although fundamental Medicare reforms have not been enacted, private insurance plans and consumer
choice play an increasingly important role in the program. Medicare beneficiaries have had the option of
receiving their benefits through a health maintenance organization (HMO) since the mid-1980s, although
access to such plans has been limited to certain geographic areas. More recently, the menu of private plan
options available to beneficiaries has expanded to include preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and private
fee-for-service (FFS) plans. Enrollment in these new types of private plans has grown rapidly. Since 2003, the
number of beneficiaries in these plans has nearly doubled from 5.3 million to 10.2 million in March 2009
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009). By the end of 2008, nearly one quarter of Medicare beneficiaries received
their health care through a private plan (Gold, 2009). Private insurers also play a central role in Medicare’s
prescription drug program. In Medicare Part D as in the standard model of managed competition, consumers
choose from a menu of private insurance options and bear the incremental cost of choosing a more costly plan
(Neuman and Cubanski, 2009). In light of these public policy developments, there is great interest among
health policy analysts in the health plan choices of elderly consumers and, in particular, the effect of price
on those choices.
This article analyzes a unique natural experiment to provide new evidence on this issue. We use 4 years of
data from the health benefits program of the University of Michigan (UM) to estimate the effect of price on the
health plan choices of Medicare-eligible retirees. The analysis exploits quasi-experimental variation in price
caused by two important changes in the UM’s benefits policies that occurred during the period we analyzed.
First, changes in the UM’s premium contribution rules dramatically increased the price of the plan that had
the greatest enrollment among retirees. This price increase is similar to the variation that is the basis of elasticity
estimates produced by prior studies on health plan choice in a managed competition setting (Buchmueller and
Feldstein, 1997; Cutler and Reber, 1998; Buchmueller, 2000; Strombom et al., 2002).
It is the second policy change that makes the natural experiment we analyze unique and which allows
for a stronger identification of the effect of price on plan choice. At the same time that the UM changed
its contribution rules, it decided that individuals who retired before a certain date would be exempted from
having to pay any premium contributions for their health insurance. Hence, although at the start of our
analysis period all retirees faced the same prices, by the end of the period there was a dramatic difference
in premiums between people who retired before and after the cutoff date. Further, this cutoff date was
chosen retroactively by more than a decade, alleviating concerns that the change in policy may have influenced
decisions to retire before the cutoff.
The sharp discontinuity in prices caused by the UM’s ‘grandfathering’ policy allows for stronger econometric
identification than the research design used in most prior studies. We use regression discontinuity techniques to
compare the plan choices of people who retired just after the cutoff date, and therefore faced significant price
changes, to a control group of otherwise similar retirees who retired just before this date, for whom price was
not a factor at all. This comparison allows us to isolate the effect of price, effectively controlling for unobserved
plan characteristics that may be correlated with premiums and unobserved individual characteristics that may
affect plan choices.
We find a statistically significant effect of price on health plan choice. Although very small changes in price
have no discernible effect on plan choice decisions, larger price increases led to a significant reduction in plan
1See, for example, Enthoven (1988), Aaron and Reischauer (1995), Butler and Moffit (1995), and Dowd et al. (1996).
2Available at http://thomas.loc.gov/medicare/mtg31599.html, accessed on July 21, 2010.
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market share. Our estimates imply that, ceteris paribus, a $10 increase in monthly premium contributions (rel-
ative to a $56 average out-of-pocket premium difference between the highest and the lowest cost options) will
lead to a 2 to 3 percentage point decrease in a plan’s market share. This estimate of the marginal effect of price
and the corresponding price elasticities are close to estimates generated by previous studies.
1. PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Estimating the effect of price on health plan choice decisions requires detailed data on the choice set facing
individual consumers, including the exact prices for each choice alternative. Perhaps the best source of such
data is the administrative files of large employer-sponsored health benefits programs. One concern with
research on the basis of such data is external validity. Even if a study exploits variation in price that is plausibly
exogenous, the results may still be sensitive to specific features of the program analyzed and therefore may not
generalize to other settings. As a result, there is a benefit to having multiple studies using data from different
sources and different identification strategies.
Several studies analyze the effect of premium contributions on the health plan choices of active employees
who are offered a choice of health plans (Feldman et al., 1989; Dowd and Feldman, 1994; Buchmueller and
Feldstein, 1997; Cutler and Reber, 1998; Royalty and Solomon, 1999; Strombom et al., 2002; Naessens
et al., 2008). A consistent finding from this literature is that employees are quite sensitive to price and are
willing to switch plans in response to relatively small differences in premiums. In the studies that explicitly
calculate them, elasticities of plan choice with respect to the employee’s out-of-pocket premium—that is,
the ‘enrollee-perspective’ elasticity—are generally in the range of 0.2 to 0.8. Because the enrollee’s
out-of-pocket premium represents only a small portion of the total premium, taking the insurer perspective—that
is, calculating the elasticity of plan choice with respect to the total premium—yields much higher elasticities.
These elasticities range from 1 to 8.
Analyses that allow the effect of price to vary with age and health risk indicate that older employees and
individuals with greater expected healthcare use are considerably less price sensitive than their younger,
healthier counterparts (Royalty and Solomon, 1999; Strombom et al., 2002; Naessens et al., 2008). These
patterns raise a concern that research based on working adults may not generalize well to Medicare
beneficiaries. There has been less research on the price sensitivity of this population.
Two prior studies use data on retirees that are similar in important ways to ours. Buchmueller (2000)
analyzes the plan choices of retirees from the University of California (UC) after the UC adopted a fixed dollar
contribution policy, which caused out-of-pocket premium contributions to increase for some plans but not
others. Regression estimates for retirees imply that a $10 increase in monthly premium contribution led to a
1.3 percentage point decline in plan enrollment. A key limitation of this analysis is that the main source of price
variation is across plan types (i.e. FFS versus HMO) and affected all retirees in the same way. Thus, estimates
of price sensitivity may be confounded by consumer preferences for other plan attributes or by changes in those
attributes occurring at the same time as the price change.
A second study by Buchmueller (2006) uses data from another employer-sponsored program in which
premium contributions for retirees are determined by the date an individual retired and his or her years of
service at that time. As in our UM data, the rules of the program create essentially random within-plan variation
in prices, which is ideal for estimating price effects. The results suggest a slightly more elastic demand than
what was found for UC retirees, although the estimated elasticities are smaller in absolute value than what most
studies have found for active employees. One limitation of this study is that the sample analyzed is relatively
young and includes both Medicare-eligible retirees and retirees 65 years and younger. Employer-sponsored
insurance plans, because of the way they interact with Medicare, provide different benefits for these two
groups. As a result, elasticity estimates for a mixed sample may be confounded by changes in plan enrollment
occurring when an individual qualifies for Medicare. Even if this were not an issue, there remains a question of
how well results for younger Medicare beneficiaries generalize to older beneficiaries.
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2. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
2.1. Data source and sample construction
Our analysis includes retirees from all three UM campuses (Ann Arbor, Dearborn, and Flint) and covers the
years 2002 to 2005. Over this period, the UM provided health benefits to more than 5000 retirees, of whom
more than 4000 were Medicare beneficiaries. The menu of plans available to these retirees resembles the
options currently available to Medicare beneficiaries more generally. The choice set included, in various years,
three different HMOs, a point-of-service (POS) plan, two FFS plans, and two PPOs. Provider networks and
plan generosity were stable during this period aside from some modest increases in co-payments and deductibles.
Plan choices are made during an annual open enrollment period that takes place in the fall, with the choices being
effective for the following calendar year.
Because our interest is in understanding the price sensitivity of Medicare beneficiaries, we exclude from
the analysis 1093 retirees under age 65 as well 294 retirees with covered spouses not yet eligible for Medicare
or with dependent children. Because the data extract was formed on the basis of individuals who were in the
benefits system in 2007, we do not have data on retirees who were enrolled in the early years and
subsequently died and left the system. However, this selection is likely to be of negligible importance because
the surviving spouses of UM retirees retain eligibility for health benefits. Hence, the family units will remain in
the sample, although their characteristics can change. These sample selection criteria result in a sample of 3182
individuals per year. Individuals who retired from academic positions (e.g. faculty and academic staff)
represent roughly one quarter of this sample (813 individuals).
2.2. Plan prices and enrollment
As noted, our identification strategy exploits changes in UM’s policies that generated quasi-experimental
variation in plan premiums. The effect of these various policy changes on the prices faced by retirees can be
seen in Table I, which presents the monthly premium contribution for each plan in each year. In the first 2 years
of our data, the UM’s contribution toward retiree coverage was set at the premium of the plan with the greatest
enrollment, a major medical plan offered by the Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan in conjunction with
United Health Care (for brevity, we will refer to this plan as BCMM). In 2002, more than 70% of UM retirees
were in this plan. BCMM enrollees were not required to make monthly premium contributions, whereas those
Table I. Plan offerings and required contributions, 2002–2005
2002 2003 2004 2005
Blue Cross Major Medical Single coverage 0.00 0.00 16.30 42.60
Two-party coverage 0.00 0.00 32.50 130.50
Blue Cross PPO Single coverage NA NA NA 0.00
Two-party coverage NA NA NA 43.40
MCare HMO Single coverage 29.50 0.00 14.10 13.10
Two-party coverage 65.50 0.00 28.20 71.40
MCare POS Single coverage 54.60 0.00 14.10 15.90
Two-party coverage 115.70 0.00 28.20 77.20
MCare PPO Single coverage NA NA NA 31.30
Two-party coverage NA NA NA 107.90
Care Choices HMO Single coverage 38.40 8.30 14.60 22.10
Two-party coverage 83.20 16.50 29.30 89.50
HAP HMO Single coverage 114.80 15.60 14.80 15.90
Two-party coverage 236.00 31.10 29.50 77.10
Comprehensive Major Medical Single coverage NA NA 15.20 20.60
Two-party coverage NA NA 30.40 86.60
Contributions listed for 2002 and 2003 applied to all retirees. In 2004 and 2005, contribution amounts applied only to individuals who
retired on or after January 1, 1987. Individuals retiring before this date could choose any plan without paying a monthly contribution.
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choosing a more costly plan paid the difference between that plan’s premium and the BCMM premium. The
single coverage contributions for the other plans ranged from $30 to $115 per month.
Starting in 2003, UM ‘carved-out’ prescription drug benefits. Because prescription drug spending was not
distributed equally across plans, this change affected plan premiums and enrollee premium contributions.3
As a result of this change, the required contributions for all plans besides BCMM decreased, whereas BCMM
remained free for retirees.
The next year, UM changed its premium contribution policy to one where it paid 95% of the cost of the plan
chosen by employees or retirees.4 At that time, it was decided that individuals who had retired before January 1,
1987, would not be required to pay any premium contributions, regardless of the plan they chose. This date was
chosen for legal reasons rather than for anything to do with the retirement or plan choice decisions of UM
retirees.5 Given this motivation and the retrospective nature of this decision, it is reasonable to assume that
the price variation generated by this policy is exogenous to retiree preferences or other unmeasured factors that
might influence plan choice decisions. The distribution of retirement dates, presented in Figure A1, supports
this assumption. Figure A1 plots the number of retirements by quarter for a 4-year period bracketing the
January 1, 1987, cutoff date. We reported the data separately for academic and nonacademic positions because
faculty retirements tend to occur at the end of the academic year, whereas retirements by nonacademics do not
exhibit such a strong seasonal pattern. Apart from this difference, there is no obvious pattern in the data. The
number of nonacademics retiring in the last quarter of 1986 is slightly lower than the number retiring in the first
quarter of 1987. This is the opposite of what we would see if individuals were rushing to retire to qualify for
more generous benefits.
The combination of the change in the contribution policy and the grandfathering decision meant that in 2004
out-of-pocket prices for pre- and post-1987 retirees began to diverge. The small contributions that were
required in 2003 were eliminated for pre-1987 retirees. For individuals who had retired after January 1,
1987, enrollment in BCMM now required a monthly premium contribution of $16.30 for single coverage
and $32.50 for family coverage. BCMM was no longer the lowest cost option for retirees, although the
difference between it and less expensive plans was very small—approximately $1 or $2 per month for single
coverage.
UM altered its contribution policy more significantly in 2005. Under the new policy, UM’s contribution
toward single coverage was set equal to 95% of the average premium for the two lowest cost plans on the menu,
and the contribution for dependent coverage was set so that in aggregate the UM paid 85% of the average
premium. Employees and retirees who chose more expensive plans now had to pay the full difference between
the plan’s premium and the fixed UM contribution. The combination of this change plus differential trends in
total plan premiums meant that BCMM, which only 2 years before had been the low cost plan on the menu,
was now the most expensive option, with a monthly contribution of $42.60 for single coverage and $130.00
for two-party (i.e. retiree plus spouse) coverage.
Table II presents the distribution of plan choices for the period of our analysis. The top panel presents data
for all retirees with Medicare coverage; in the second and third panels, we cut the data by retirement age,
differentiating our ‘control group’ of pre-1987 retirees and our ‘treatment group’ consisting of individuals
retiring on or after January 1, 1987. In 2002, approximately 70% of all Medicare-eligible retirees were enrolled
in BCMM. BCMM was chosen by a higher share of retirees in the control group than in the treatment group.
Most of this difference is driven by higher likelihood that the control group had moved away from the Ann
3Under the carve out, coverage (e.g. preferred formularies) and co-payments for prescription drugs do not vary across plans. Plan premiums
are set to reflect the vendor’s cost for medical coverage plus the uniform (across plan options) average self-insured cost of the prescription
coverage.
4Details of the 2004 policy change and its effect on premiums for active employees are described by Okeke et al. (2010a).
5When they began considering altering the contribution policy, human resources administrators were concerned about the potential percep-
tion that the UM was reneging on an implicit contract with existing retirees. A review of benefits materials and related communications
with employees and retirees indicated that since at least 1988, these materials had explicitly stated that the UM retained the right to alter
its policy on plan premium contributions and consequently retirees could at some point be required to pay more for their coverage.
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Arbor area, and once this and other characteristics are accounted for, retirement date no longer predicts plan
choice (see Table VI). The second most popular plan (MCare HMO) enrolled 19% of the full sample. MCare
also offered a POS plan that enrolled 3.3% of all UM retirees. Because the market shares for the remaining
plans were all in the low single digits, we grouped these plans together.
As noted, premium contributions for the HMOs between 2002 and 2003 fell, although these plans were still
more expensive than BCMM. The values presented in Table II show that the HMOs did not gain market share
because of the change in relative prices. Similarly, the small price changes that occurred between 2003 and
Table II. Distribution of plan choices by year
2002 2003 2004 2005
Full sample (N =3182)
Blue Cross Major Medical 69.9% 69.9% 69.4% 57.8%
Blue Cross PPO – – – 12.6
MCare HMO 19.0 17.1 16.3 15.6
MCare POS/PPO 3.2 5.1 5.4 5.4
Other Plans 7.9 8.0 8.2 7.9
Waived Coverage 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.7
Retired before January 1, 1987 (n= 1123)
Blue Cross Major Medical 83.1% 82.6% 82.8% 80.7%
Blue Cross PPO – – – 2.0
MCare HMO 11.8 11.1 10.7 10.2
MCare POS/PPO 1.1 2.1 2.1 2.7
Other Plans 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.5
Waived Coverage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Retired after January 1, 1987 (n = 2059)
Blue Cross Major Medical 62.7% 62.9% 62.1% 45.4%
Blue Cross PPO – 18.4
MCare HMO 23.0 20.4 19.4 18.5
MCare POS/PPO 4.4 6.7 7.2 7.0
Other plans 10.0 10.0 10.4 9.7
Waived Coverage 0.0 0.1 0.9 1.1
Table III. Regression discontinuity results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable
1. BCMM2002 0.024 0.005 0.026 0.027 0.031
(0.040) (0.039) (0.064) (0.059) (0.060)
2. BCMM2003 0.015 0.003 0.035 0.036 0.045
(0.041) (0.039) (0.064) (0.060) (0.070)
3. BCMM2004 0.039 0.021 0.007 0.008 0.012
(0.042) (0.040) (0.066) (0.040) (0.070)
4. BCMM2005 0.160 0.141 0.175 0.177 0.180
(0.044)* (0.043)* (0.072)* (0.068)* (0.076)*
5. BCMM2005  BCMM2002 0.137 0.136 0.200 0.204 0.211
(0.032)* (0.032)* (0.049)* (0.049)* (0.053)*
Sample of retirees All All 5 years from 1/87 5 years from 1/87 All
Specification of R Quartic Quartic Quartic Quartic Local polynomial
Covariates No Yes No Yes No
No. observations 3182 3182 1467 1467 3182
Each row represents separate regressions of BCMM enrollment in a particular year as a function of retirement date (R). The covariates in
columns 2 and 4 are gender, marital status, surviving spouse status, residential location (dummies for living in Ann Arbor and living out of
state), and mean income in the person’s zip code. The local polynomial regressions use a bandwidth of 2. Standard errors (robust in columns
1–4, bootstrapped in column 5) are in parentheses.
*Significant at the 0.05 level.
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2004 did not shift enrollment. In contrast, it seems that the increase in BCMM’s price between 2004 and 2005
did lead to a significant decline in that plan’s market share. In the full sample, BCMM enrollment declined by
roughly 12 percentage points. The data in the lower two panels of Table III show that this decline was almost
entirely driven by the retirees who faced a price increase. Among post-1987 retirees, BCMM enrollment fell by
16.7 points, compared with a decline of 1.9 percentage points for pre-1987 retirees. Most of the retirees who
left the BCMM plan switched to the less costly PPO that Blue Cross began offering that year. The market share
of other plans on the menu changed only slightly.
3. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
3.1. Regression discontinuity results
The difference in the way that enrollment patters changed over time for pre- and post-1987 retirees suggests a
negative effect of price on health plan choice. The obvious problem with this comparison is that the two groups
are different in several ways. Indeed, in 2002 when the two groups faced the same prices, pre-1987 retirees
were 20 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in BCMM. This problem of heterogeneity can be
minimized, however, if we limit the comparison to individuals who retired just before and just after January
1, 1987. Even if there is a general relationship between retirement date and plan choice, the stark nature of
the grandfathering policy provides a source of clean identification. Because the cutoff date was chosen
retroactively in 2004, there is no way that the difference in contribution rules applying to pre- and post-1987
retirees could have affected retirement decisions. As a result, for people who retired near the cutoff date, assign-
ment to the treatment and control groups is essentially random. Therefore, we can use regression discontinuity
(RD) techniques to estimate the effect of the price changes that took place in 2004 and 2005.
Because BCMM enrolled such a high percentage of UM retirees over this period and because it seems that it
was the price increase for this plan between 2004 and 2005 that induced the strongest demand response, our
regression analysis focuses on enrollment in that plan. The main dependent variable we analyzed is a binary
variable, BCMMit, which equals one for individuals enrolled in BCMM in year t and zero for those who
enrolled in other plans or chose to waive coverage.6 For each year of enrollment data, we estimated the
following model:
BCMMit ¼ at þ Xibt þ 1 Tið Þ  g1t Rið Þ þ dtTi þ Ti  g2t Rið Þ þ uit (1)
The binary variable T identifies members of the treatment group who retired after January 1, 1987; Ri is an
integer corresponding to the exact date of retirement, and g1t(.) and g2t(.) are flexible functions of R. In Figures 1
and 2, we reported results from a weighted local polynomial regression (Nichols, 2007).7 The estimates of d
from this specification along with bootstrapped standard errors are reported in the last column of Table III.
For the sake of comparison, and to show that our results are not sensitive to functional form, we also reported
alternative parametric specifications. In columns 1 and 2 of Table III, we reported results from a model in which
the regression is estimated using the full sample of retirees, and g1t(.) and g2t(.) are specified as fourth-order
polynomials of R. The model in column 1 does not include covariates. The model in column 2 includes the
following: age (in 2002), age squared, gender, zip code level of average income and indicator variables for
surviving spouses, individuals with two-party coverage, those living in Ann Arbor, and those living out of state.
We repeated these two specifications in columns 3 and 4 while restricting the sample to individuals who retired
no more than 5 years before or after January 1, 1987.
6Our focus on this binary outcome is similar to the approach taken by Cutler and Reber (1998) and Buchmueller (2000). In those studies, as
in ours, the main source of price variation was changes in the price of a popular plan, and there was limited price variation among other
smaller plans.
7The models reported in the figures and column 1 of Table III use a triangular kernel with a bandwidth of 2. The results are not sensitive to
the use of alternative kernels or bandwidths.
PRICE SENSITIVITY OF MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 41
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Health Econ. 22: 35–51 (2013)
DOI: 10.1002/hec
We begin by estimating the relationship between retirement date and BCMM enrollment in 2002 and 2003.
These outcomes provide an important test of the validity of the RD approach for analyzing the effect of price
changes that occurred in later years. Because the grandfathering policy was not yet established, in 2002 and
2003 pre- and post-1987 retirees faced the same prices. In other words, for these years, there is no ‘treatment’,
Figure 1. Regression discontinuity estimates, 2002 to 2004
Figure 2. Change in BCMM enrollment, 2005 minus 2002
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which means there is no reason to expect a discontinuity in BCMM enrollment around the retirement date of
January 1, 1987. The regression discontinuity results are consistent with this expectation. Panel A of Figure 1
shows that in 2002, individuals who retired in early 1987 were slightly more likely to be in BCMM than those
retiring in late 1986.8 However, this difference is not significantly different from zero. The point estimate of d
from the local polynomial regressions is 0.03, with a bootstrapped standard error of 0.06. The other two models
reported in Table III also indicate that there was no significant difference in BCMM enrollment between our
treatment and control groups in 2002. Although the point estimates vary across the samples and specifications,
none come close to being statistically significant; the largest absolute t-statistic is 0.59. The plot for 2003
(Figure 1B) is barely distinguishable from the one for 2002, which reflects the fact that the decline in required
contributions for the HMOs between 2002 and 2003 did not induce movement out of BCMM.
By 2004, the grandfathering policy was in place, although the difference in prices faced by pre- and
post-1987 retirees was small. For pre-1987 retirees, BCMM was free, whereas for post-1987 retirees, the
required contribution for BCMM was only a few dollars per month higher than the cost of other plans. The
RD results presented in Figure 1C and Table III suggest that this price difference was not enough to affect
enrollment decisions. In the local polynomial model, retirement after the cutoff date led to an insignificant
1.2% increase in the probability of choosing BCMM. The results from the quartic models also indicate no
significant difference in BCMM enrollment between the treatment and the control groups.
We do find a larger and statistically significant treatment effect in 2005. Recall that in that year, the price of
BCMM for post-1987 retirees increased to $42.60 for single coverage and $130.50 for two-party coverage.
Because the lowest cost options required a $43 contribution for two-party coverage, the incremental cost of
choosing BCMM was $87 for two-party coverage. Weighting these amounts by the percentage of retirees in
each coverage tier yields an average price difference between the treatment and the control groups of $56
per month.9 In Figure 1D, we plotted the relationship between retirement date and BCMM enrollment in
2005. The graph to the left of the grandfathering cutoff date is virtually identical to the plot for the earlier
years, indicating that there was very little plan switching among pre-1987 retirees. Just to the right of the
grandfathering cutoff date, there is a discrete drop in BCMM enrollment, indicating that the price increase
caused some post-1987 retirees to switch out of BCMM.
The three regression specifications reported in Table III imply that the price increase led to a significant
decline in BCMM enrollment. The point estimate is slightly larger when we put more weight on people
who retired close to the cutoff date. The local polynomial model indicates that the probability of choosing
BCMM is 18 percentage points lower for individuals who retired just after the grandfathering cutoff date
compared with those who retired just before. The point estimates from the quartic models in columns 3 and
4 are similar: 0.175 when we do not include covariates (column 3) and 0.177 when we do (column 4).
Dividing these estimates by the difference in the average price for the treatments and controls yields a marginal
price effect of 0.003. In other words, these results imply that a $10 increase in monthly premium contributions
will reduce the plan’s share of total enrollment by 3 percentage points. Below, we discussed the magnitude of these
effects in the context of the previous literature.
The effect of the price increase on plan switching can be shown more directly by analyzing the relationship
between the retirement date and the change in BCMM enrollment between 2002 and 2005: ΔBCMM=
BCMM2005  BCMM2002.10 Analyzing switching allows us to better hold constant time invariant factors, such
as individual preferences and nonprice plan attributes, which may affect plan choice decisions. Figure 2
presents the plot of the local polynomial regressions for this outcome. On both sides of the cutoff date, the fitted
8For visual clarity, we limit the plot to observations with retirement dates no more than 5 years before or after January 1, 1987.
9Among individuals retiring no more than 5 years before or after the cutoff date, 69% have single coverage.
10Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997) and Buchmueller (2000) examined the effect of price changes on the decision to switch out of any plan,
which they modelled as a binary outcome. In our switching analysis, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 for people who
switched from BCMM into one of the other plans, 1 for people who switched into BCMM, and 0 for people who did neither.
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curves are essentially horizontal. In columns 3–5, the estimated gap between the two curves is approximately
20 percentage points, which is slightly larger than the corresponding cross-sectional result for 2005.
The fact that the fitted regression line is flat to the right of the cutoff date indicates that within the treatment
group, the response to the price increase did not vary with retirement date. This finding along with the null
results for 2002 and 2003 provides support for the research design. As an additional specification check, we
test whether other variables exhibit discontinuities at the grandfathering cutoff date. It is to be expected that
pre-1987 retirees are older on average than post-1987 retirees. However, a difference in mean age is not by
itself a threat to our research design. On the other hand, we would be concerned if there were a discontinuity
in age around the retirement date of January 1, 1987. We test for such a discontinuity in age and other
covariates.
Results from these tests are reported in panel A of Table IV. The specifications are the same as those in
columns 1 and 5 of Table III.11 With one exception, all of the estimated discontinuities are statistically
insignificant. That exception is the local polynomial model for the percentage of male retirees, which suggests
that men represent a higher proportion of individuals who retired just before January 1, 1987, as compared with
those retiring just after that date. A closer inspection of the date suggests that this is not a real discontinuity. In
Figure A2, by year of retirement, we plot the percentage of male retirees. Figure A2 shows that this percentage
is generally increasing with respect to retirement date, although the graph is fairly jagged. Because the
value for 1985 (30.7%) is below the trend line, whereas the value for 1986 (48.3%) is above, the slope
of the local polynomial regression is quite steep just to the left of the cutoff. Alternative specifications that
put less weight on the data from 1986, such as the other model reported in Table IV, indicate a smaller,
statistically insignificant change in the percentage of male retirees around the cutoff date. Similarly, a simple
Table IV. Sensitivity Tests
(1) (2)
(A) Testing for discontinuities in covariates
1. Age in 2002 0.482 0.742
(0.525) (0.658)
2. Male 0.047 0.201
(0.046) (0.079)*
3. Married in 2002 0.015 0.030
(0.046) (0.115)
4. Surviving spouse in 2002 0.040 0.002
(0.028) (0.049)
5. Lives in Ann Arbor in 2002 0.031 0.072
(0.047) (0.078)
6. Lives out of state in 2002 0.043 0.021
(0.035) (0.065)
7. Average income of 2002 zip code 1.109 1.687
(1.215) (2.040)
(B) Testing for discontinuities in BCMM2005 at other dates
8. January 1, 1985 0.050 0.035
(0.171) (0.072)
9. January 1, 1989 0.032 0.000
(0.260) (0.092)
Regressions reported in panel A are for the full sample. Those in row 8 of panel B pertain to individuals who retired before January 1, 1987
(n= 1111), and the estimates in row 9 are for individuals retiring after that date (n= 2054). For both panels, the estimates in column 1 are
based on separate quartic regressions on either side of the cutoff date. In panel A, there are no covariates. The regressions in column 1 of
panel B include the full set of covariates from Table III. The results in column 2 of both panels are from local polynomial regressions (using
a bandwidth of 2). Standard errors (robust in column 1, bootstrapped in column 2) are in parentheses.
*Significant at the 0.05 level.
11Because there is little correlation among the covariates, adding controls to the quartic model reported in column 2 has no effect on the
estimated discontinuity. Therefore, we do not report these models.
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comparison of all individuals who retired in the 2 years before and after January 1, 1987, reveals no significant
difference between the percentage of male retirees (see Table V). Because of this general pattern and the fact that
gender is not a significant predictor of BCMM enrollment (see Table VI), we are confident that our main
estimates are not confounded by the gender composition of our treatment and control groups.
As an additional specification test, we estimated the discontinuity in BCMM2005 at retirement dates other
than the actual grandfathering cutoff. The results from two such placebo tests are reported in panel B of
Table IV. In row 8, we limited the sample to people who retired before January 1987 and estimate the
discontinuity at January 1, 1985. In row 9, we conducted a similar exercise on the other side of the cutoff,
testing for a discontinuity at January 1, 1989. In both cases, the estimated discontinuities are not significantly
different from zero.
3.2. Estimating the marginal effect of price
The RD analysis provides strong evidence that the increase in BCMM’s price between 2004 and 2005 led to a
significant decline in that plan’s market share, although the smaller price changes between 2003 and 2004 did
not affect plan enrollment. To provide an overall estimate of the effect of price and to facilitate comparisons
with estimated price effects from prior studies, we combine the data for all 4 years and estimate the following
regression model:
BCMMit ¼ Xitbþ θPBit þ mi þ vit (2)
The independent variable of primary interest isPBit, the monthly cost of the BCMM plan relative to the lowest
cost option on the menu.12 As shown in Table I, this price depends on whether or not the policy covers a
dependent. In principle, retirees could respond to an increase in price by dropping dependent coverage; in
reality, we do not observe such behavior in our data on UM retirees.13 Therefore, we assign to each individual
the relative BCMM price corresponding to their coverage tier (retiree only or retiree plus spouse).
The error term includes both an individual-specific effect, mi, and an i.i.d. disturbance, nit. We report regres-
sions from fixed effect specifications, although models that treat mi as a random effect yield essentially identical
Table V. Sample characteristics by date of retirement
All retirees Retired 1985–1986 Retired 1987–1988
Age (years) 74.99 77.84 76.14*
Male 0.42 0.40 0.41
Married 0.47 0.40 0.44
Surviving spouse 0.09 0.14 0.08*
Academic 0.25 0.23 0.27
Lives in Ann Arbor 0.46 0.43 0.49
Lives out of state 0.16 0.20 0.14*
Zip code average income ($000) 42.09 36.23 40.13*
Number of observations 3182 369 308
*Difference between pre- and post-1987 retirees is significant at the 0.05 level.
12In principle, the relative price of BCMM should be computed with reference to each retiree’s next preferred alternative, which is unob-
served. In 2005, the prices for all the other plans are all within a dollar of each other, so choosing one or another as the point of compar-
ison or using an average of non-BCMM prices yields essentially the same result. In 2005, the low cost option is the Blue Cross PPO,
which is the plan chosen by most of individuals who switched out of BCMM. Thus, there is no reason to expect our results to be sensitive
to the construction of the price variable.
13In other research, we find that active employees do drop dependent coverage when the incremental cost of that coverage increases (Okeke
et al., 2010b). Active employees who drop dependent coverage typically do so when their spouse has the option of coverage through his
or her own employer. Spouses of retirees are much less likely to have an alternative source of employer-sponsored coverage. In addition,
the university’s rules make it difficult to reenroll the spouse of a retiree after dependent coverage has been dropped.
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estimates of θ. This is not surprising given the nature of our price variation. In addition to reporting results for
the full sample of UM retirees, we also report estimates for subsamples who retired within different windows
around January 1, 1987. The logic for restricting the sample in this way is the same as that behind the regression
discontinuity models. Although more recent cohorts of retirees may make different health plan choices than
earlier cohorts, there is no reason to think that individuals who retired just before this date are different in ways
that affect their demand for health insurance than individuals who retired just after this date.
Table V presents the summary statistics for the full sample of retirees and for the treatment and control
groups defined according to a window of plus or minus 2 years. To give a fuller sense of how the samples
compare, Table V presents time-invariant variables that drop out of the fixed effect model. As would be
expected, individuals who retired between 1985 and 1988 are slightly older than the full sample of UM retirees,
and those who retired in 1985–1986 are slightly older than those who retired in 1987–1988. Other differences
between the treatment and the control groups relate to where they live: pre-1987 retirees are more likely to have
moved out of state and less likely to live in Ann Arbor. Because of these location decisions, pre-1987 retirees
live in areas with lower average incomes.14
The main regression results are reported in Table VI. The results in the first column are for the full sample of
retirees. In column 2, we restrict the sample to individuals who retired no more than 5 years before or after the
grandfathering cutoff date. In column 3, we tighten the focus to 2 years on either side of that date. The estimated
price coefficients for the three samples are essentially identical. All three imply that a $10 increase in monthly
premium contributions will lead to a reduction in plan market share of between two and three percentage points.
Note that this price effect is slightly smaller than the one implied by the RD analysis of the 2005 data. The
reason is that it essentially averages that effect with the zero effect of the much smaller price increase that
occurred between 2003 and 2004. The magnitude of this overall effect is similar to that found in prior studies.
The most comparable study is Buchmueller’s (2000) analysis of data on UC retirees in the 1990s. The parameter
14The income variable is formed by assigning each individual the ZIP code–level mean income from the 2000 Decennial Census based on
their ZIP code of residence in 2002. This crude measure is intended to capture cross-sectional differences in income among retirees. As
such, we did not recode this variable for individuals who moved during the period of our analysis.
Table VI. Linear probability regression results
Full sample Retired 1982–1991 Retired 1985–1989
Price of BCMM 0.0023 0.0028 0.0026
(0.0002)* (0.0003)* (0.0005)*
Age: 75 to 84 years 0.0094 0.0142 0.0254
(0.0117) (0.0150) (0.0201)
Age: 85 years and older 0.0189 0.0262 0.0243
(0.0145) (0.0188) (0.0266)
Lives in Ann Arbor 0.0571 0.0521 0.1321
(0.0307) (0.0372) (0.0635)*
Lives out of state 0.0961* 0.0585 0.0008
(0.0407)* (0.0459) (0.0037)
Two-party coverage 0.0502 0.0323 0.0078
(0.0329) (0.0447) (0.0602)
Year = 2003 0.0019 0.0030 0.0075*
(0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0037)*
Year = 2004 0.0009 0.0059 0.0144
(0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0063)*
Year = 2005 0.0342 0.0336 0.0434
(0.0070)* (0.0086)* (0.0130)*
Number of observations 12,644 5840 2700
Number of individuals 3161 1460 675
Results are from a fixed effects model. The dependent variable equals one for individuals enrolled in BCMM and zero otherwise. Robust
standard errors (clustered by retiree) are in parentheses.
*Significant at the 0.05 level.
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estimates from that study imply that a $10 increase in monthly premium contributions would cause a plan’s
enrollment to decline by between 1 and 2.5 percentage points, depending on the estimation sample analyzed.
After accounting for inflation, our estimates fall squarely in the center of that range. Our estimated price effects
are slightly smaller in magnitude than the estimates from the other study by Buchmueller (2006), who used data
on retirees from a private company.
In Table VII, we report alternative elasticity estimates for the full sample as well as for different subsamples
of interest. Expressing marginal price effects as elasticities can be sensitive to the point at which the function is
evaluated. Because premium contributions were fixed at zero for the control group and started at zero for the
treatment group, the mean price for BCMM in the full estimation sample is fairly low: $9.90 per month. Using
this value along with the full sample mean for BCMM’s market share yields an ‘enrollee-perspective’ elasticity
of 0.034. When we evaluate the elasticity function at the mean price and market share for our treatment
group, the price elasticity is 0.06. These are smaller in absolute value than the estimated elasticities from
the two comparable prior studies (Buchmueller, 2000, 2006). However, this difference is driven by the fact that
the mean premium contribution was higher and the mean market share was lower in those data sets.15
In columns 2 and 3 of Table VII, we report results from models estimated separately by coverage tier—single
coverage and two-party coverage. The point estimates of the marginal price effect are nearly identical for these
two groups. Because premium contributions are higher for two-party coverage, the implied elasticity is slightly
higher for this group, although the difference is not economically meaningful.
One potential criticism of studies that use data on UM employees is that highly educated academics are not
representative of employees and retirees more generally. Although the fact that faculty and academic staff
represent only approximately one quarter of the retirees in our sample mitigates this concern, it is useful to test
whether individuals who retired from academic positions are different from nonacademic retirees. The last two
columns of Table VII show that the results are not sensitive to this stratification. The fixed effect specification
yields identical estimates of the price coefficient for these two groups.
It is common in the literature to calculate ‘insurer-perspective’ elasticities by evaluating the elasticity
function at the full premium charged by a health plan rather than at the subsidized price faced by enrol-
lees. The lower panel of Table VII reports such estimates. In 2005, the full premium for the BCMM plan
was $318 per month for retirees with Medicare choosing single coverage and $636 for retirees choosing
two-party coverage. Because 66% of UM retirees in the full sample chose single coverage, these values
translate to an average price of $425 per month. Evaluating the function at this price and the mean
Table VII. Estimated premium elasticities
Full sample Single coverage Two-Party coverage Academic Nonacademic
Marginal price effect 0.0023 0.0021 0.0023 0.0024 0.0024
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Enrollee-perspective elasticity
At sample mean for all retirees 0.034 0.021 0.045 0.045 0.033
At sample means for post-1987 retirees 0.060 0.041 0.069 0.069 0.061
Insurer-perspective elasticity
At sample means for all retirees 1.47 0.98 2.02 1.52 1.46
At sample means for post-1987 retirees 1.73 1.14 2.20 1.71 1.75
Number of observations 12,644 8399 4245 3236 9408
The estimation samples for these results are not limited by retirement date.
15In terms of the regression specification, our analysis is most similar to that of Buchmueller (2000). The plan that was the focus of that
study had a mean monthly price of $56.80 and a mean market share of 51%.
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BCMM market share for the full period yields an elasticity of approximately 1.5. Doing the same cal-
culations using means for all post-1987 retirees gives an insurer-perspective elasticity of 1.7.16
4. CONCLUSIONS
This article presents new evidence on the effect of price on the health plan choices of retirees in a managed com-
petition setting. The analysis uses data on Medicare-enrolled retirees from the UM and exploits quasi-
experimental price variation caused by the UM’s policies governing the premium contributions required of retir-
ees. During the period of our analysis, the premium contribution charged for the most popular plan on the UM
menu increased significantly. Because of a prior policy decision, this price increase affected individuals who
had retired after a certain date, but not those who had retired before this date. This grandfathering policy creates
a sharp discontinuity in prices that effectively divides UM retirees into treatment and control groups according to
when they retired. Because the cutoff date was set retroactively, it is not possible that the policy could have
affected retirement decisions. We use regression discontinuity methods to analyze this natural experiment.
Although our research design is different than previous studies on the health plan choices of retirees,
our results are quite similar. Like prior studies focusing on this population, we find that prices matter for
plan choice among Medicare retirees, although the magnitude of the effect is small. At the start of the
analysis, most UM retirees were in a major medical plan offered by BCMM in conjunction with United
Health Care. Because of its importance in the program and because of the limited degree of price varia-
tion in other plans, we model the probability of choosing it relative to any of the others. Descriptive
results show that small increases in the cost of the Blue Cross plan relative to others on the menu had
no detectable effect on retiree enrollment decisions. However, when the price of this plan increased by
roughly $40 per month for single coverage and more than $100 per month for two-party coverage, there
was a significant migration to less expensive plans.
Using dating for the full period, we estimate the average effect of price on the probability of choosing
BCMM. Our point estimates imply that, ceteris paribus, a $10 increase in premiums leads to a reduction in plan
market share of between 2 and 3 percentage points. This marginal effect translates to an insurer-perspective
elasticity of between 1 and 2. These results are similar to those of earlier studies on retirees and smaller
in magnitude than price effects estimated for active employees.
Although the finding that the health plan choices of retirees are less sensitive to price than the choices of
active employees, the exact reasons for this result are not clear. One possibility may be related to the fact that
switching among managed care plans can require changing providers, or at least adapting to new policies
regarding referrals and reimbursement. To the extent that they have stronger ties to particular providers, older
consumers may be more reluctant than younger consumers to make such changes. However, the fact that
research from other countries also finds a negative relationship between age and sensitivity to health insurance
premiums suggests that this cannot be the entire answer.17
The difference in choice behavior between active employees and retirees may have to do with the ability tomake
financial decisions and the resources that are available to inform those decisions. To make price-sensitive plan
choices, consumers must be able to evaluate trade-offs between monthly premium payments and other financial
and nonfinancial aspects of alternative plan options. Such decisions may be difficult for older consumers. Recent
studies by Fang et al. (2008) and Levy and Weir (2010) find that cognitive ability is a significant factor
influencing whether Medicare beneficiaries purchase supplemental insurance or enroll in Medicare Part D.
16The insurer-perspective elasticity is slightly higher for the post-1987 retirees for two reasons. One is that because a slightly higher per-
centage of post-1987 retirees have two-party coverage, the mean BCMM premium for this group is slightly higher than the mean for
the full sample ($438 vs 425). Second, the BCMM market share over the full period is lower for the post-1987 retirees (0.582 vs 0.667).
17For example, recent studies using data from Germany and the Netherlands, where consumers can switch insurers without having to switch
providers, find that smaller premium elasticities for older consumers compared with younger consumers (Schut et al., 2003; van Djik
et al., 2008).
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The ability to make good decisions will also depend on the information that is available about choice alternatives.
Although in the typical health benefits program active employees and retirees receive similar written materials,
employees may have better access to informal sources of information, such as feedback from fellow
employees. If cognition and information are important factors affecting retirees’ health plan choices, careful
consideration should be given to providing retirees information and decision aids that may enhance the
response to price. More research on how exactly elderly consumers make health insurance purchase
decisions would be valuable.
Because our estimated price effects are based on a comparison of treatment and control groups who faced
different prices for the same plans in the same years, we are able to hold constant benefits and other plan
characteristics, such as the size and reputation of the provider panel. This is both a strength and a limitation of
our analysis. On the positive side, we can be sure that our estimates are not confounded by aspects of plan quality
that may be correlated with price. The limitation is that it is not possible with data like ours to say anything about
how consumers make trade-offs between premiums and other plan characteristics. Understanding these trade-offs
is important in programs like Medicare Part D, where there is considerable variation in nonprice plan attributes.
With any study using data from a single employer, external validity is a concern. Not only is it possible that
UM retirees are not representative of all Medicare beneficiaries, but it is important to note that our elasticity
estimates are driven mainly by the behavior of a subset of UM retirees, namely, those enrolled in the Blue Cross
Blue Shield. The fact that our results are so similar to those of studies using data from other markets reduces but
does not eliminate this concern.
If the managed competition approach were applied to Medicare, the effect of such reforms on overall health
spending would depend importantly on the strategic behavior of competing health insurers. Another limitation
of case studies like the one we analyze is that they are generally not well suited for drawing lessons regarding
the supply side of the market. However, such lessons may be gleamed from the health insurance exchanges that
will soon be established (and the Massachusetts Connector, which is already in operation) as well as from the
market for stand-alone drug coverage under Medicare Part D. Understanding how insurers compete in these
new markets is an important goal for future research.
APPENDIX A
Figure A1. Distribution of retirement dates by quarter relative to January 1987
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Figure A2. Percentage of male retirees by year of retirement
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